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PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606 (1993)

spct317_0609 | spct317_0610 | spct317_0611

610PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries

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statute simply does not say that. It says that the accrued sick leave may be used during the parental leave. Nothing in the language of the statute even remotely suggests that accrued sick leave may be applied to a kind of leave other than the one for which it has accrued simply by reason of a happenstance that the employee is enjoying a different kind of leave while some of the accrued sick time remains." Id. at 364 (Joseph, C. J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

Judge Edmonds also dissented. He concluded that ORS 659.360(3) is ambiguous, but that its legislative history supports PGE's interpretation. Id. at 365 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). PGE petitioned for review in this court.

PGE contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that ORS 659.360(3) requires an employer to allow an employee to use accrued paid sick leave during a parental leave, even though under the collective bargaining agreement the employee would not be entitled to use that paid sick leave unless he was actually sick or injured or was using it for routine medical or dental exams. PGE argues that in the context of this case the phrase "The employee * * * shall be entitled to utilize any accrued vacation leave, sick leave or other compensatory leave * * * during the parental leave" should be construed to mean that the employee could use such accrued leave only if the employee would be eligible to use that leave at that time because he actually was sick or injured, or for routine medical or dental exams. Thus, PGE asserts, the first sentence of ORS 659.360(3) may be conditioned by a limitation found in a collective bargaining agreement.

In interpreting a statute, the court's task is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020; State v. Person, 316 Or 585, 590 , 853 P2d 813 (1993); Teeny v. Haertl Constructors, Inc., 314 Or 688, 694 , 842 P2d 788 (1992). To do that, the court examines both the text and context of the statute. State v. Person, supra, 316 Or at 590 ; Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 316 Or 495, 498 , 852 P2d 197 (1993). That is the first level of our analysis.

In this first level of analysis, the text of the statutory provision itself is the starting point for interpretation and is the best evidence of the legislature's intent. State v. Person, supra, 316 Or at 590 ; State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Ashley, 312 Or

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(c)2010 Ron Ledbury, ronled [at] pdxlawg.us

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1998 forward not included in data set, not yet anyway